

Introduction

by Norman Sempijja

Africa rising? Navigating the nexus between rhetoric and emerging reality

The African narrative over the centuries has been crafted by outsiders who have come in and, depending on their interests, taken whatever perspective they have and disseminated it to the world. For example, the continent of Africa was once the white man's grave due to the diseases that afflicted explorers and missionaries. The danger espoused by the continent and perceived backwardness of the people led some people to coin the phrase that Africa was the «White Man's Burden» and so colonialism was championed to civilise the savage African (Prasad, 2005).

Yet since the turn of the 21st century, many articles and books are being written about Africa being on the rise. For example, *The Economist* has been at the forefront of pushing the agenda that Africa is on the rise. This has included publications such as "Africa is the rising star" (*The Economist*, December 3 2011), and "Business conferences are filled with frothy talk of African lions overtaking Asian tigers" (*The Economist*, March 2 2013). Ernst and Young have also joined the train by publishing a report called "It's time for Africa" (Ernst & Young, 2011). Some writers have gone on to predict that "Africa will rule the twenty-first century" (*African Business*, January 2013). Others have argued that "The Next Asia Is Africa" (French, 2011). This, according to Taylor, is based on "Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) figures, which saw an average continental growth of 5.6% between 2002 and 2008, making Africa the second fastest-growing continent in the world" (Taylor, 2015).

The book seeks to examine whether indeed Africa is on the rise. This is done through navigating the nexus between rhetoric and emerging reality. The book has 3 sections which are crucial to understanding whether Africa is on the rise. One section covers governance. This is mainly due to the fact that development and governance

move hand-in-hand. Working institutions elicit confidence in both investors and the common people. This in the long run spurs development. The second section explores economic development which will encompass key issues around socio-economic development among others like blue economy. Yet socio-economic developments help explore development at the macro level and at the micro level looking into issues around poverty and inequality. Lastly the book examines security on the continent. The security development nexus has become part of the discourse when exploring development, especially in Africa, as without one it will be impossible to achieve the other.

When examining the nexus between rhetoric and emerging reality, the study will delve into whether the perception that Africa is rising is indeed true or merely high-sounding rhetoric. But to measure if Africa is rising there is a need to explore the agency exercised by Africans and whether they own the narrative. For example, if the economies in Africa are growing, how involved are common Africans in this drive? Do they own the process? Thus, the level of agency plays a vital role in showing if Africa is indeed rising. This is vital in differentiating between the rhetoric and emerging reality.

In the section below, the work delves deeper into the three sections which will also be conceptualised to develop a deeper understanding as to whether Africa is rising.

Governance in the Africa rising discourse

In the throes of the Cold War, African countries found themselves thrust into a bipolar system requiring them to take sides and at the same time deal with geopolitical and internal issues that arose after independence. The colonial state was no democracy yet conspired to bequeath to the successor state a democratic system with no historical practice.

In a bid to remain in power but also cast off the shackles of the colonisers, African leaders disregarded democracy and embraced the authoritarian state, mimicking the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and Vietnam among others. This was to a large extent opportunistically used by some leaders like Obote, Said Barre, and Mengistu Haile among others, who plunged their countries into conflict. Others like Julius Nyerere believed in the socialist form of governance, and although they never experienced conflict, their countries were poorer after the end of the Cold War.

The post-Cold War period was punctuated by democratisation processes set up by the World Bank which published a report *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to*

Sustainable Growth, reiterating a need for good governance in Africa, a call which was made to the donor community to tie the aid to governance (WorldBank, 1989). The belief was that good governance in the guise of constitutional democracy created institutions that drew support from the masses and hence would spur development. Along with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank believed that by opening up political space and introducing contested politics people would make the rational choice by electing people who were more accountable. This was to be a self-correcting process where the people rewarded better performing leaders and removed the non-performers.

Countries like Zambia and Ghana were seen as the success stories of democratisation. But conflicts broke out in most countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central Africa Republic, Rwanda, and Burundi to mention but a few. Even after 2010, states like Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda are seen as hard states with restricted political space and weakened civil society (Carbone, 2005). Kenya went through electoral violence in 2008 and corruption has been the hallmark of most governments, including the much-lauded Zambia (Taylor, 2006).

Yet a number of countries have gone through the transition from military to civilian rule and have had a number of election cycles. Most prominent was Nigeria when President Obasanjo took over and then handed power to Goodluck Jonathan, who then passed the baton to the current president, Buhari. Plus, it should not be left out that southern Africa has seen changes of power in South Africa, Angola and Zambia among others. The Arab Spring also brought changes in Tunisia and Egypt.

Thus, there is an agreement that good governance is vital for Africa to rise. It leads to stability as power changes hands through democratic institutions. These institutions which normally manifest in the arms of government like Parliament, judiciary and executive act as a deterrent to violence if they are run in a just and transparent manner.

Delving deeper into governance, the Mo Ibrahim Index shows the challenges of governance post 20th century in Africa. To gauge the governance performance of Africa indicators like transparency and accountability, public management and rule of law have been used. Data from the five regions of Africa were examined from 2000 to 2017. It can be argued that a period of 18 years can help decipher the trends in governance, economic development and security to draw conclusions whether Africa is rising or not.

From the trends there is a clear link between a stable security outlook and improvement in transparency and accountability. For example, Southern Africa has experienced a peaceful post-Cold War era and scores highly on transparency and accountability. The performance, although declining, is far above the average for Africa.

North Africa experienced a dip in transparency and accountability between 2007 and 2011, and the subsequent Arab Spring can be attributed to that. Thereafter it seems to be on the rise, though the trajectory is wavy. The instability in East and Central Africa is also reflected in the poor performances of both regions, while West Africa is on par with the average performance in Africa. This can be attributed to the mixed performance in regard to security. The rise of Boko Haram has destabilised Nigeria, Niger and the Republic of Cameroon among others.

Overall it is clear that since the turn of the century, African states are performing poorly on transparency and accountability as they are below the average (50%). Yet to be on the rise, transparency and accountability in government structures are essential in driving economic development.

Figure 1 Transparency and Accountability in Africa




Own computation (Source Mo-Ibrahim Index)

In regard to Public Management, the graph below shows that the least transparent and accountable regions, East and Central Africa, are indeed the worst performers, although it has to be noted that East Africa has made vast improvements as shown by the trajectory of the curve.

North and Southern Africa are above average in performance, but they experience a collective dip in 2007, a development that can be attributed to the global economic downturn. Thereafter the performance is more or less stable. The two regions are joined by West Africa, which displays a continuous rise, with a slight dip in 2014. Yet

the performance is not above average, especially after 2007. This shows a worrying trend for Africa as a continent, especially as there is a growing link between stability, transparency and accountability, and public management. The management of public resources is crucial for driving the economy and attracting investor confidence and foreign direct investment therein.


Figure 2 Public Management in Africa



Own computation (Source Mo-Ibrahim Index)

In regard to the rule of law, again the Southern region is performing much better than the rest. Quite interesting is the fact that the score is above average. But also, having performed well in regard to transparency and accountability and public management, it is not surprising that the region is outperforming the rest of Africa in regard to the rule of law. West Africa is mainly around the average but has been on the rise since 2012. Yet the less stable regions like Central Africa and East Africa are at the bottom. It has to be noted that they are joined by North Africa which went into a dip during the economic crisis of 2007 and this was not helped by the Arab Spring of 2011.

Figure 3 Rule of Law in Africa



Own computation (Source Mo-Ibrahim Index)

Therefore, from the point of view of governance, Africa has not performed well when its performance is tested against the indicators above. The book goes into deeper governance issues to give a more robust appraisal of the performance of the continent and what the underlying bottlenecks are.

For example, **John Rabuogi Ahere** examines Africa's dalliance with democracy and asks the question "Whose democracy?" His chapter argues that one of the reasons is that the process of democratisation in African states has been implemented using legal frameworks whose design is, specifically, based on the ideologies, values and political cultures of former colonial masters and are generally, in line with the political systems preferred by the Global North. It also argues that African states need to fabricate the concept of democracy from the beliefs, ways of life and values of their people. That way, the will of the people is reflected in the respective legal frameworks and political systems. Otherwise as it stands, most African states are using legal and political frameworks that they either do not understand or do not believe in. As a result, Africa's rise is in a spin due to the fact that it has limited agency over the democratisation process, which is also measured using the definitions and parameters of the Global North.

Colin Mongale, Kgame Molohe and Hazel Tomodi delve into the challenges of democratic consolidation in post conflict societies with specific focus on Southern African cases like Zimbabwe and Angola. Through the use of Wallestein's perspective on conflict they hold the view that whereas the two states claim to be democratic, their democratic picture is bleak as their systems are fluid and susceptible to internal and external shocks.

Elizabeth Chinang's chapter focuses on whether civilian-led revolutions lead to democratic transition in Africa, with case studies involving Tunisia and Egypt. She notes that the democratisation of African states, perceived to spur improved governance systems resulting in rapid economic growth and development, is one of the beliefs coining the emergence of the "Africa rising" conception. Though the concept has proven susceptible to criticism, debates around the validation of the above and other miscellaneous statements continue to surface. The subsequent piece seeks to contribute to the discussion through assessing the relationship between democracy and political revolutions, by seeking to answer the question: Do civilian-led political revolutions lead to democratic transitions? This is explored through the extensive analysis of the Arab Spring (2011) in Tunisia and Egypt.

In their chapter "*Power, politics and the undoing of Zimbabwe's post-colonial sustainable development agenda*", **Patrick Dzimiri and Gilbert Tarugarira** note that the post-independence era saw Zimbabwe being caught in the insensitive

web of power politics, where the strategy of patronage triumphed over good governance and honest politics. Patronage kept the system running at the expense of the country, and the bulk of its people argue that local power politics, more than anything else, militated against the fundamental changes required for sustainable development in Zimbabwe. The study established that the divisive and exclusionary nature of the politics of belonging within the ruling elite's political networks paralysed development efforts. This study also highlights the factors at play in terms of governance in Africa and end up negatively affecting the development of the state.

Turyatemba Bashasha analyses the failure of Uganda to effectively adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers since independence. He postulates that although on attaining independence the separation of powers was envisaged as one of the cornerstones of Uganda's constitutionalism, after nine regimes the story has been different. There has been a mixture of greed for power and use of the military by the political elites, and a citizenry that is heterogeneous and lacking in civic competence hence unable to agitate successfully for the rule of law.

Economic development in the Africa rising discourse

Post-independence Africa was pitied due to the lack of development, and when most states got caught up in the Cold War politics leading to inter-state and intra-state conflicts, the detractors reinforced their arguments by branding Africa a place without hope. The famine in Ethiopia in the 1980's (Salama, 2001) further showed African states as being unable to fix their own continent.

The 90's were punctuated with International Monetary Fund and World Bank shock therapy in the form of structural adjustment policies and the call for democratisation of African countries. The enforced reforms did not stop the festering of dictatorships and the manipulation of electoral processes to perpetuate authoritarian regimes.

Currently Africa has the youngest population in the world, with at least three fifths of the inhabitants below 25 years. Interestingly, even with increasing education, 80% of the workers are in the informal sector. This means that, although the informal sector used to employ the uneducated, currently secondary and tertiary graduates are entering the informal sector due to lack of jobs which is leading to under-employment (Boateng, 2018) but also highlights the importance of the informal sector.

Quite interestingly, George W. Bush, as cited by Mahajan in his book *Africa Rising: How 900 Million Consumers Offer More Than You Think* argued that Africa was going

through a new era, rooted not in oil or diamonds, but in the talents and creativity of its people. Mahajan adds that “[t]he true wealth of Africa is its more than 900 million consumers, and its countless entrepreneurs and business leaders who are already demonstrating the wealth of the continent by building successful enterprises” (Mahajan, 2009).

Thus, even with some of the fastest-growing economies in the world like Tanzania, and DR Congo, Ian Taylor (2015) argued that Africa is actually not rising. The proponents of the notion of Africa rising are basing it on intensification of resource extraction while dependence is on the rise. Inequality, and de-industrialisation are also hitting the African continent (Taylor, 2015).

Taylor’s argument is also supported by the World Bank which, when examining growth in sub-Saharan Africa, noted that although the region had rebounded from the global crisis of 2008 due to increases in the population of working age and capital stock accumulation, there was a likelihood of the growth slowing down after 2018 due to labour force growth, stagnation and capital accumulation moderation. These would then weigh on per capita incomes, diminishing prospects of poverty reduction in the long run. Hence, the region needed to engage in structural reforms involving looking for additional investment, improving the health and education sectors, and increasing female labour participation (Worldbank, 2018).

So, the World Bank shows a need to address socio-economic issues like health, education and poverty in order to keep the economies growing. Otherwise continued inequality merely enriches a few and alienates a large section of the population, thus having a cumulative effect on reducing labour supply and investment.

Furthermore it needs to be noted that Africa has not fully tapped into its blue economy. This sea-blindness has limited the continent’s potential in regard to widening its sources of revenue. Policy makers have indeed focussed on industries relating to natural resource extraction, tourism and agriculture among others. However, they have paid little or no attention to the seas and the advantages they bring. This gap has been filled by pirates in Indian ocean and the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, with little attention paid to such an important source of revenue, the emerging reality is the continued sea-blindness of the African continent has weakened the Africa rising narrative.

When exploring data on the performance of the different regions of Africa on a number of indicators on economic and social economic issues, a link emerges between security, governance and economic development. Economic development, it can be deduced, is dependent on good governance and security.


A case in point is that in regard to the business environment, the Southern region performs much better than the others, a trend which is showcased under security and governance. The region is above average in so far as providing a conducive business environment is concerned.

Although North Africa was on the rise in the early years of the new millennium, it declined once the Arab Spring broke out. Hence insecurity made investments and the business environment very difficult. The genesis of the insecurity in the region is linked to bad government, especially dictatorships in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.

West Africa has performed around average, a trend which was also prevalent in regard to governance (transparency and accountability, rule of law and public management). Linking this to security, the medium security threats of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and Boko Haram in the Niger basin can be linked to medium performance, especially as the economic community is more advanced as regards regional integration.

East and Central Africa have experienced insecurity and performed poorly in terms of governance. Hence this has not created a conducive business environment to attract investors into these states.

Figure 4 Business Environment in Africa




Own computation (Source Mo-Ibrahim Index)

With regard to infrastructure, all regions are experiencing an upsurge in infrastructural development. However, it remains to be realised whether the infrastructure is to benefit the locals or multinationals. Questions linger as to whether ordinary Africans can access the infrastructure, as more than 80% of their business is conducted in the informal sector.

On further scrutiny, the development of infrastructure is not affected by global or regional issues. For example, the 2008 economic downturn does not seem to deter the improvement in Africa.

The only seemingly constant issue is the region in conflict: the Central African region is the poorest performer. Likewise, East Africa seems to have closed the gap with West Africa which has performed around average on many occasions. It is also evident that the Arab Spring did not impact on the development of infrastructure in the Northern region.

Figure 5 Infrastructural Development in Africa




Own computation (Source Mo-Ibrahim Index)

With regard to education, access to education is important in judging whether Africa is on the rise. Consequently, the Northern and Southern Regions have performed above average, the West is close to the average for the continent and the Central and Eastern regions are the worst performers.

Nevertheless, it is quite interesting that all regions dip during the global economic downturn, except for West Africa which is on an upward trajectory. Accordingly, from the data it is clear that insecurity impacts on education negatively as shown by the Central and Eastern Regions. It can be deduced that global economic recessions have negatively impacted on education in Africa.

It is also noteworthy that the Western, Central and Eastern regions are all below 50%. Hence lack of education does not augur well for the development of Africa. It should also be noted that the Northern and Southern regions are declining towards the halfway mark. Hence in the context of Africa rising, an uneducated population will struggle to push the country with regard to development.

Figure 6 Educational levels in Africa



Own computation (Source Mo-Ibrahim Index)

Thus, the book delves into these socio-economic issues, the informal sector and alternative sources of income for countries especially in the maritime region in what has come to be known as the Blue Economy.

Kgame Molope examines “Africa and the sustainable global Blue Economy agenda” by postulating that increasingly, there is mounting attention to the blue waters of the seas as the source of livelihood and a driver of economic development across all regions of the world. The Blue Economy has drawn the attention of states, corporates and civil society alike as an emerging development paradigm for economic growth. He argues that whereas the Blue Economy may hold solutions to economic growth challenges for African states to realise their true potential, there is more to do for corporates and civil societies to achieve the envisaged inclusive growth and social prosperity. Critical to the ideals of the sustainable Blue Economy are provision of substantial financial resources, effective participation by the African people, and good governance. Whereas African economies show more trade in commodities, services and manufacturing, the colonial era established and entrenched foreign exploitation of the economies of Africa’s oceans. To this end, the maritime trade in Africa has little to show towards developing traditional and emerging sectors.

Mpho Santho moves the debate on the Blue Economy within the South African context by questioning whether it can lead to economic development in South Africa. This programme is in line with the National Development Plan 2030. The programme is inspired by the Malaysian Big Fast Results methodology. Although the programme intends to create an inclusive oceans economy through creation of jobs, reducing

poverty and inequality, and also to improve the economic growth of South Africa, there are challenges and limitations that could hinder the progress of the programme.

Thus, since economic development has been looked as the key ingredient of Africa rising, **Aubrey Setjie** focusses on alternatives to traditional development models by exploring the efficacy of the informal economy in the development of the African economy. He argues that the informal economy not only accounts for a higher share of employment in Africa, but also contributes to poverty reduction. Given that sub-Saharan Africa is plagued by poverty and skyrocketing unemployment, the informal sector remains a panacea to the development potential of Africa due to its ability to create employment and its contribution to the livelihoods of African people. He argues that the narrative of African development is driven by the belief in the power of liberal economic policies, but more importantly, entrepreneurship and free trade. Access to financial assistance and infrastructure remain major obstacles for the informal sector. The informal sector has become an essential driver for Africa's development.

Kugara, S. L, Matshidze, P. E, Netshandama V. O, Mdhluli T. D and Makhanikhe T. J explore the philosophical perspectives of indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) and western knowledge systems (WKS) as worldviews that can be adopted to shift the human development trajectory of Africa to a higher level. They contend that worldviews guide one's thinking, beliefs and assumptions about society, and how one views the world. IKS is one worldview that is argued to have helped in preserving the natural environment, peace, order and the integrity of African societal structures. Yet it should be noted that IKS was suppressed by the colonial policies. Therefore, the chapter's quest is to acknowledge the views of IKS on buttressing Africa's agency, for which WKS leaves very little space.

Security in the Africa rising discourse

Jackson (2010) observed that the African landscape had been altered since the end of the Cold War, as the continental struggle against apartheid and proxy wars sponsored by superpowers were now part of history. Thus African security discussions were dominated by the continent's position on the matrix of trans-national and trans-continental threats, its natural resources, and the extent to which China presented an alternative developmental and strategic engagement to the West (Jackson, 2010).

Resource conflicts have blighted the continent as exemplified in Sierra Leone, the Central Africa Republic, DR Congo, Angola and South Sudan. It should be noted that Africa was also part of the new wars paradigm as stated by Kaldor (2013),

where a rise in intra-state conflicts tore societies apart (Kaldor, 2013) as has been the case in Rwanda, South Sudan, and DR Congo to mention but a few. Most recently there has been a rise in terrorism which has slowly spread across the continent as Muslim minorities in some countries like Mozambique are rising up to challenge the state (Salema, 2018). The opportunism of some groups like Boko Haram aligning themselves with the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) has not gone unnoticed (Cavigelli, 2018). Moreover, the activities of organised criminal gangs in West Africa, North Africa and East Africa (Shaw, 2018) have continued to pose a security threat on the continent dampening investor confidence.

It should be noted that African states have continued to acquire agency in dealing with security problems as shown by a more robust African Union in Somalia under AMISOM, the multinational joint task force in the Niger basin fighting Boko Haram and the continued collaboration with the UN in peacekeeping, as is the case with the Force Intervention Brigade in DR Congo.


The current security apparatus on the continent under the African Union with the African Peace and Security Architecture is a far cry from the Organisation of African Unity, which was viewed as a talking shop and unable to deal with the conflicts on the continent. Intervention had been left to countries such as France, which had come to be known as the “gendarmier” of Africa.

Nevertheless, the African Standby Force is not yet operational, and when Mali faced a crisis in 2011, France intervened, much to the chagrin of the African states. It should not be forgotten that African states like Uganda have intervened in the affairs of other states, with the support of the United States of America and the United Kingdom (Clarke, 2001).

Thus, the book explores issues around intervention and non-intervention in conflicts in Africa and the need for deeper commitment by African states as they explore African solutions to African problems. When exploring data on security in Africa, it is important to examine the performance of different regions on personal and national security, and navigate linkages, especially with development but also governance.

In terms of personal security, the Northern region initially performed better than the rest until the break-out of the Arab Spring in 2011. A clear dip to below 40% was registered, yet the region was performing much better in previous years. Quite noticeable also is the fact that the dip is not sudden but begins in 2005 and is more pronounced after the 2008 global recession. Since the northern part of Africa is also linked to the Middle East, the spread of the instability, especially from Libya and Syria,

Figure 7 Personal Security in Africa



Own computation (Source Mo-Ibrahim Index)


continued to affect personal safety. Moreover, the subsequent proliferation of terror organisations and the security vacuum left by Muammar Gaddafi after his ouster has created a precarious security situation especially for neighbouring states.

The Eastern and Central African regions have been plagued by instability especially in the Great Lakes region and the Central Africa Republic. Coupled with this is the spill-over from the Western African fight with Boko Haram. These have combined to create a human security problem for Africans in Central and Eastern Africa. This has also negatively affected governance as shown earlier, due to lack of proper governance institutions and mechanisms to monitor them.

Southern and Western Africa have had relatively above average human/personal security, yet challenges persist. For example, in Southern Africa, human security threats are precipitated more from internal push and pull factors than external (Africa, 2015; Weidlich, 2010). Africa and Weidlich see threats to human security in the context of poverty, access to medical care, hunger and inequality among others (ibid). West Africa has been destabilised by terror groups like Boko Haram. Therefore, although human security may be viewed in the context of these authors, the extra dimension of internal displacement, attacks from militias, sexual and gender-based violence among others make for a greater number of human existential threats in the West than the South of Africa.

With regard to national security, Southern Africa and West Africa are performing much better than the rest due to the lower prevalence of inter-state or cross-border conflicts. The major protagonist that the West African states are dealing with is Boko

Figure 8 National Security in Africa



Own computation (Source Mo-Ibrahim Index)

Haram, and from the outset it has been seen as an internal matter. However, the group has utilised the forests in the north of Nigeria and the Niger basin as a safe haven, thereby destabilising the neighbouring states like Niger and Chad, among others.

The north of Africa has experienced conflicts in Libya, and the stateless nature of the country thereafter has negatively affected neighbouring states. The Central and Eastern regions, although unstable internally, do register above average scores on national security. Yet they are below the African average.

But from the five indicators, there is a link between governance and security. The regions like Southern Africa performed well on governance and in the process showed good performance on security overall. The Central and East African regions have struggled on governance and thus have showcased poor performance on security, especially personal security.

Quite interestingly, all the regions have performed well above average on national security. Consequently, in the post-Cold War era, the security threats are not largely externally generated but more internally. This is supported by the weak showing on personal security by the regions which are plagued by internal conflicts

When delving into the notion of African solutions to African problems, **Kepha Natolooka** asks the fundamental question as to what extent does this phenomenon provide a suitable approach to effectively resolve inter-state and internationalised conflict in Africa. He premises his views on the envisaged post-colonial peace on the continent, yet conflicts have been the norm, affecting the socio-economic and political set-up on the continent. His chapter assesses the effectiveness of African Solutions

to African Problems (ASAP) as a conflict resolution approach in Africa through the lenses of the mechanisms for its formation, conceptualisation, operationalisation, its work approach, resource mobilisation and utilisation, and its past challenges and achievements.

Frank Lekaba moves the debate to interstate relations through his work on *“SADC’s intervention in Lesotho; balancing regionalism and local participation in the country’s mediation and a positive contribution towards Africa Rising”*. He notes that the discourse on Africa rising signifies the positive outcomes towards the continent’s renewal and rebirth. It draws its genesis from the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002. Even with Agenda 2063, the intervention in conflicts necessitates the need to have a local voice in it. Accordingly, through the discussion on Lesotho, he argues that peace has been elusive in Lesotho since after the 1970 elections. SADC started intervening in the country from 1993 onwards, with no lasting solution. Only after the local voices actively participated in the mediation process of the country after 2009, when the SADC facilitator, Botswana’s former president Sir Ketumile Masire, abandoned the process, that positive efforts towards the country’s stability were registered. Currently the country is on a laudable path of relative peace and stability, with the convening of national dialogues on reforms to be pursued by government.

Prince Gontse Motaung examines the collaboration between MONUSCO and the Force Intervention Brigade in DR Congo and asks the question about Africa finding solutions to its problems. He postulates that as conflicts in the twenty-first century have morphed from mainly inter-state wars to intra-state conflicts, the United Nations (UN) and other actors, such as the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), have had to transform peacekeeping from a process conducted by impartial military observers to one carried out by more robust and offensive entities. Thus, the FIB and MONUSCO interaction is symbolic of the evolving collaboration between the UN and African regional arrangements, where resources are exchanged in a bid to fulfil UN Security Council mandates.

Resego Reamoetse Letlhogile builds on the environmental security debate with her seminal work focussing on food security in Africa, with South Africa as a case study. She argues that although Africa has experienced economic growth on a macro level, hunger and poverty remain paramount. On top of that has been the introduction of genetically modified foods in the food chain. This has disadvantaged small-scale farmers who cannot afford the cost of Genetically Modified seeds. But this inevitably has led to increased food prices exacerbating poverty and destitution among the ordinary Africans.

Letlhogile thus highlights the human security challenges, especially in Southern Africa, showing that security is no longer defined in the context of inter-state conflict. Now non-state actors have become major security players, especially in the context of climate change, which affects human security and is not affected by existing borders.

Conclusion

Africa as a rising continent indeed has registered fast economic growth over the years but to fully appreciate whether it is indeed rising, it is crucial to explore different aspects of its development, especially in relation to some of pre-existing bottlenecks that have hindered its growth. Consequently, there is a need to connect development to two pillars, which are governance and security, without which it is difficult to foster development. This is crucial to in differentiating between the rhetoric and emerging reality

It is also imperative to note that Africa as a continent is not homogenous; it is made up of over 50 countries and each region has grown differently as they all face different challenges. Yet the link between security, governance, and the impact on development persists for all the regions.

Last but not least, Africa is linked to the global economic system and although it may not feel the impact of the growths and downturns as much as the more developed states, it gets affected in the long run. Yet linking African development to the neo-liberal system denies it agency and ability to harness its potential. The utilisation of the informal and blue economy is very much at the centre of African growth. Hence, emerging challenges are in sight, especially as the world embraces the fourth industrial revolution.

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